George C Marshall: An Enduring Model of Leadership Effectiveness by Clarcq, Jack et al.




George C Marshall: An Enduring Model of
Leadership Effectiveness
Jack Clarcq
Rochester Institute of Technology
Richard DeMartino
Rochester Institute of Technology
Michael E. Palanski
Rochester Institute of Technology
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.rit.edu/article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized
administrator of RIT Scholar Works. For more information, please contact ritscholarworks@rit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Demartino, Richard and Clarcq, Jack and Palanski, Michael, George C. Marshall: An Enduring Model of Leadership Effectiveness
(October 26, 2011). Journal of Character & Leadership Integration, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 17, Fall 2011. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1949855
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1949855
Volume 2 | Issue 1 | Fall 2011 17
Abstract
General George C. Marshall is universally recognized as a paragon of leadership. Marshall’s effectiveness as 
the leader of the U.S. Army during World War II, the State Department during the early post-war era, and 
the Defense Department during the Korean War are well known and documented. As a result of his many 
accomplishments, a number of researchers and historians have explored traits and factors that underlie 
Marshall’s success. While many of these efforts provide insight into Marshall’s leadership style, none employ 
original data (interviews) specifically focused on leadership, management, and character. This paper is based 
on interviews conducted in 1998 of the last remaining Marshall subordinates. These individuals—Brigadier 
General Erle Cocke, Jr., General Andrew J. Goodpaster, General Walter T. Kerwin, Ambassador George 
F. Kennan, and Mr. H. Merrill Pasco—were interviewed specifically pertaining to Marshall’s management 
and leadership approach. The findings, depicted in this article, outline and map Marshall’s effectiveness in 
both personal and organizational leadership.
George  C. Marshall: 




Authors’ Note:  This paper is dedicated to the memory of the exceptional individuals who were interviewed for this 
project. The world is a lesser place without them. We give a special thanks to the Marshall Foundation for their support.
Clarcq and DeMartino serve as equal lead authors.
Introduction
The early 21st century is a period of rapid and 
pervasive economic and political changes. 
Organizations—both public and private—are 
struggling to adapt to these changes and complex 
environments with various levels of success. 
Exceptional leadership is critical to effectively 
address complex organizational challenges.
Today’s political, economic, and business 
environments are not unique for their rapid and 
pervasive change and associated opportunities 
and challenges. The Second World War and the 
challenges of the early Cold War period reflect such 
times. The challenges faced by the U.S. government 
and military were extraordinary. A parochial 
and undertrained U.S. Army would grow from 
190,000 to over 8,000,000—entailing profound 
organizational, cultural, and logistical challenges 
(U.S. Center for Military History, 2009a, 2009b). 
Similarly, governmental organizations capable of 
developing and implementing a robust foreign 
policy would have to emerge, which required a 
dramatic transformation.
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This article explores the origins and foundations of 
General George C. Marshall’s effective leadership 
during the pivotal period of WWII and the ensuing 
Cold War. George Marshall served as the U.S. 
Army chief of staff during WWII and led the rapid 
expansion, professionalization, and modernization 
of the U.S. Army. During the period after WWII, 
Marshall served as secretary of state and later as 
secretary of defense, leading the U.S. response to 
the expansionist Soviet threat and the rebuilding 
of Western Europe. These challenges required 
innovative public policy strategies, creative and 
innovative organizational development, and above 
all, exceptional leadership. 
The leadership and accomplishments of General 
Marshall, who was referred to by Winston Churchill 
as “the architect of victory” and by others as “the 
rebuilder of Europe,” were profound and enduring. 
Marshall was referred to by renowned management 
expert Peter Drucker as one of the greatest leaders 
and industrial managers of the  twentieth century 
(Drucker, 1967, p. 64). Undoubtedly, General 
Marshall was an extraordinary individual with 
a combination of unique personal qualities that 
made him a highly revered and effective leader. 
The George C. Marshall Foundation, created 
at the suggestion of President Harry S. Truman 
in 1953, organized and documented Marshall’s 
accomplishments. The foundation’s research library 
is replete with an impressive array of information 
documenting the general’s life and activities. 
Research materials include interviews of Marshall 
and his contemporaries, supporting government, 
and other data. Drawing on this documentation, 
a number of books and articles have defined and 
explored General Marshall’s leadership. These 
efforts, however, did not employ data (particularly 
interviews) that specifically sought to understand 
his leadership and character as a public servant. 
This paper is based on original unpublished 
data collected exclusively to explore the effective 
leadership of General Marshall. 
One pervasive theme that emerged from these 
interviews pertained to the extraordinary character 
of General Marshall as exemplified by the virtues 
of prudence, a type of practical wisdom which is 
farsighted, goal-oriented, and focused on the greater 
good, and temperance, a virtue marked by humility 
and self-regulation (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). 
Perhaps the most interesting and instructive aspect 
of Marshall’s virtue was his ability to display it in a 
variety of settings: in personal situations, in leading 
large organizations, and in dealing with external 
stakeholders. Insights from the interviews show that 
Marshall was able to act as the polite gentleman, the 
stern commander, and the consummate salesman, 
all the while maintaining a sense of consistency 
and integrity, which are the hallmarks of strong 
character (Palanski & Yammarino, 2007). 
Interviews
In 1997, the foundation sponsored a research 
project to conduct interviews with individuals 
who had served with General Marshall during 
his time as Army chief of staff, secretary of state, 
and later, secretary of defense. Five surviving 
individuals who had directly worked with General 
Marshall were identified—all have since passed 
on. The interviewees, extremely accomplished 
and distinguished in their own right, were 
interviewed regarding Marshall’s leadership and 
management characteristics. 
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The five interviewees interacted with Marshall early 
in their careers; two served as direct reports. The 
remainder interacted directly with him but reported 
to higher-level Marshall subordinates. The group 
was diverse: two interviewees were career military 
officers who later achieved the status of four-
star general (General Andrew J. Goodpaster and 
General Walter T. Kerwin); one became a successful 
corporate attorney (Mr. H. Merrill Pasco); another 
was a renowned diplomat, historian, and political 
scientist (Ambassador George F. Kennan); and 
one was a prominent public and private consultant 
(Brigadier General Erle Cocke, Jr.). Each 
interviewee enjoyed a unique relationship with 
General Marshall during his tenures as Army chief 
of staff, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. 
(An outline of the interviewees’ background and 
interactions with General Marshall are provided in 
Appendix 1.) 
Prior to conducting the study, a literature review 
was conducted based on previous Marshall-related 
interviews, documents, and research located in 
the Marshall Foundation archives. Next, a semi-
structured questionnaire was developed exploring 
the nature of such factors as management style, 
delegation, leadership characteristics, character 
traits, and approaches to alliances. This approach 
was consistent with Draft and Lewin (1990), who 
drew attention to the need to reorient research 
away from a tendency to incrementally develop 
conclusions footnote by footnote. The interviews 
were conducted from November 1997 to April 
1998. The data, insights and stories gleaned from 
those interviewed, were derived from a retrospective 
understanding of General Marshall. For example, 
Generals Goodpaster and Kerwin were four-star 
generals and not only remembered their service 
with General Marshall, but also recalled how his 
leadership philosophy, wisdom, and organizational 
insights influenced the Army and military 
throughout the remainder of the twentieth century. 
In many ways this paper serves as a celebration of 
the insights and stories of the extraordinary men 
and heroes involved in this study. For this reason, 
and to avoid repeating previous analysis, this paper 
emphasizes the insights developed from the original 
interview data. This paper’s findings, while guided 
by previous Marshall research, are not intended to 
be comprehensive, but are original in exploring the 
nature of Marshall’s leadership and character. 
Findings
Two major themes emerged from the data related 
to Marshall’s unique leadership style—his personal 
leadership effectiveness and organizational 
leadership effectiveness. These themes were based 
on a combination of attributes not aligned with a 
specific trait or context, but are more reflective of 
overall character. 
Theme I: Personal Effectiveness 
Marshall ’s personal effectiveness was grounded in 
his basic understanding of the role of leadership, a 
highly structured work environment, and his ability 
to make quick yet informed decisions. Marshall was 
unique because he stayed out of most tactical decisions. 
He created “structured environments” within his 
organizations that were complementary to his work 
routines and that facilitated speedy and informed 
decision making. Marshall ’s personal effectiveness 
was also magnified by a persona that enabled him to 
control his emotions and display high levels of personal 
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integrity, placing the public good over personal 
aspirations. 
One powerful message extracted from the 
interviews concerned General Marshall’s unique 
ability to remove himself from the temptation to 
micromanage or become involved in non-essential 
decisions. Retired Generals Andrew Goodpaster 
and Walter Kerwin, accustomed to the challenges 
of command, independently identified Marshall’s 
ability to remove himself from non-command 
decisions. When asked how General Marshall 
differed from other successful generals and leaders, 
Andrew Goodpaster paused for a moment and 
observed, “Marshall differed from other generals in 
that he kept himself out of most [tactical] decisions. 
It was not that he was uninterested; it was that he 
was disinterested in the sense of having no special 
interests” (A. Goodpaster, personal communication, 
February 10, 1998). General Kerwin supported this 
example of prudence:
He focused on the big-picture issues and 
problems and left the details to others. I’ve 
known quite a few other [high-level] officers 
who got caught up in details, and they lost 
the big-picture focus of their objectives.… He 
mainly wanted to know what the [big-picture] 
problems were, that is, what’s going on. He 
always asked [about] major issues and questions 
[that were related to such issues]. (W. Kerwin, 
personal communication, March 20, 1998)
George Kennan observed that Marshall’s efforts as 
secretary of state were focused almost exclusively on 
large-picture issues associated with surveying the 
new world situation, developing recommendations 
and building political support. 
He asked them [senior-level subordinates] to 
refrain from bothering him beyond the minimal 
unavoidable degree with demands that would 
distract his attention from the major diplomatic 
problems… which he had been appointed [to 
address]. In the major matters that preoccupied 
him, he had a limited amount of time at his 
disposal. And he was very good and very firm in 
deciding what was of first importance and what 
was not. (G. Kennan, personal communication, 
January 29, 1998)
Earl Cocke (personal communication, April 29, 
1998) also observed that Marshall wanted most 
[nonstrategic] issues handled at lower levels. 
Freed from lower-level decision making, 
Marshall could build his personal effectiveness 
around structured environments that allowed 
for strict personal work routines, concise and 
direct information flows, limited internal access, 
and accelerated decision making, which were 
appropriate to the war and early Cold War eras. As 
an example of self-regulation, Merrill Pasco noted 
Marshall’s highly structured daily routine:
He got to the office at 8:00, he had a presentation 
from the Operations Division of the activities 
of the night before—very well done, very 
articulate officers—and then he had whatever 
appointments with staff heads that had been 
requested. Then, about 11:00, he had a period 
of time when he could see people outside, but 
you didn’t make any appointments without his 
approval. And they ranged from all sorts of 
people in the Congress and in industry, from 
Mr. Bernard Baruch to John Martin, who was 
president of Pennsylvania Railroad. He left at 
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lunch to go to Fort Myers, had lunch with Mrs. 
Marshall—took five minutes to get there—he 
was back after a short nap, which he could 
always take very easily, and then he worked until 
about 4:30. He spent a lot of time reviewing 
the requests from the field and reviewing staff 
studies that were presented to him. He had a 
very strict schedule, and he had a lot of balls 
in the air. (M. Pasco, personal communication, 
November 11, 1997)
George Kennan described a similar work routine 
while Marshall served at the Department of State. 
He added that he did not work weekends, which 
were reserved for his wife and family, and as a 
result “it was very difficult to engage him during 
weekends” (G. Kennan, personal communication, 
January 29, 1998). Kennan further hypothesized 
that Marshall’s work-hour limitations were largely 
influenced by his advanced age, but this analysis 
was not noted by Pasco (who worked with Marshall 
several years earlier). Pasco observed that Marshall 
made great distinctions between work and off 
times—implicitly for effectiveness. Marshall had a 
familiar saying that “nobody had an original thought 
after 2:00” (M. Pasco, personal communication, 
November 11, 1997). 
Marshall’s daily routines were tightly controlled by 
his chief of staff, who limited internal access. Both 
Pasco and Kennan noted that only very senior-
level subordinates had open access to Marshall, a 
privilege they did not abuse. Kennan recalled, 
Access to him… was very closely controlled, 
largely in the tactful and highly competent 
hands of custodian of his outer office… Colonel 
(later General) Carter. He always was prepared, I 
think, to receive officials of the department when 
they asked to see him. But he did not like anyone 
coming to see him to pass the day or to expose 
him to problems that people had been unable to 
agree upon at lower levels. (G. Kennan, personal 
communication, January 29, 1998)
Pasco observed a similar process, noting, “You had 
access and came to discuss an issue or you didn’t come 
in” (M. Pasco, personal communication, November 
11, 1997). Kennan, analyzing the role of Marshall’s 
gatekeepers, continued, “I personally thought at the 
time, and remain of that opinion today, that the 
restraints on access to him were… wise ones. In the 
major matters… he had limited time at his disposal, 
and he was very good and very firm in deciding 
what was of first importance and what was not” (G. 
Kennan, personal communication).
Marshall was particularly galled when valuable time 
and energy were wasted on internal bureaucratic or 
petty issues. Goodpaster recalled, 
Colonel Lincoln [Goodpaster’s supervising 
officer] came back and said that he had never 
seen General Marshall so upset—red in the 
face and very tense. Marshall apparently told a 
small group, “I want to tell you what I’ve been 
doing for the last hour. I’ve been deciding which 
lieutenant general’s wife lives in which lieutenant 
general’s quarters.” That type of political busy 
work disturbed him very much. (A. Goodpaster, 
personal communication, February 10, 1998)
Marshall sought to be well informed of major 
changes and events, but also sought to keep all 
meetings and communications as brief and concise 
as possible. The interviews revealed a number of 
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mechanisms and routines to achieve this objective. 
Kerwin described his operational briefings to 
Marshall as very short, between 15 and 20 minutes: 
In essence, what he wanted was to know what 
happened, and what went wrong and the 
problems that existed. He didn’t want a dog 
and pony show… I’ll always remember how the 
general would question people in briefings and 
other discussions…. He would ask, “Why do 
you say that?” many times during the meeting. 
(W. Kerwin, personal communication, March 
20, 1998)
In another example of prudence, Pasco also noted 
Marshall’s well-known and invariable rule that 
all memos and reports had to contain a one-page 
summary. “He said if you can’t place the situation 
or solution in one page you hadn’t thought it out” 
(M. Pasco, personal communications, November 
11, 1997). Most activities that were not productive 
were avoided. Pasco (personal communication) 
observed that outside of the joint chiefs of staff 
meetings, he never recalled Marshall participating 
in roundtable meetings. Marshall felt these types of 
activities were a waste of time.
Marshall structured meetings and reports to quickly 
access information and analysis. He also demanded 
that his staff possess a thorough understanding 
of the underlying issues related to the situations. 
Marshall used this information to make quick 
and effective decisions. Goodpaster recounted an 
experience with Colonel Maxwell Taylor which 
involved two major generals in disagreement: 
Marshall read through this and finally said, 
“Well,…Taylor, what do you think I should do?” 
And Taylor said, “Well sir, I haven’t thought 
about it.” Marshall handed it back to him and 
said, “Please do so.” Taylor said, “He never 
had to say that to me again.” (A. Goodpaster, 
personal communication, February 10, 1998)
At times, Kerwin noted, “[Marshall] would review 
a summary… he would send it back to the group 
and say, ‘Find out A, B, and C for me.’ And then 
when it came back he would make a decision and 
move on to the next issue” (W. Kerwin, personal 
communication, March 20, 1998).
While Marshall’s personal effectiveness was 
positively impacted by his routines and structured 
environment, much was also based on his personal 
wisdom. His ability to make effective decisions and 
retain large amounts of information, along with 
his self-confidence, formed the core of his success. 
Goodpaster stated succinctly, 
[He was able to] get to the heart of a problem 
to comprehend complex issues and put them 
in an orderly fashion. He had the ability and 
guts to make hard decisions and to carry good 
decisions to fruition, even in the face of strong 
opposition. He also had a unique [personal] 
ability to balance and prioritize complex issues 
in order to respond to them. (A. Goodpaster, 
personal communications, February 10, 1998)
Goodpaster recounted a story shared with 
him by Eisenhower while he was president. 
Eisenhower was tasked with providing overall 
strategic recommendations for winning the war. 
He determined, through detailed analysis, that 
Germany would be our first strategic target because 
with additional time, the Germans could both defeat 
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the Soviet Union and capture the Suez Canal. From 
this analysis, and other analysis, Marshall quickly 
concluded that the US should defeat Germany 
first. Even there, though Marshall faced political 
repercussion for this plan, he moved to implement.
In major decisions, Marshall listened to all sides 
of an issue but sought to avoid protracted debate. 
The interviews suggest he was critical of too many 
issues reaching his office without a consensus from 
his senior leadership staff. Kerwin noted that “He 
wanted to know what they recommended, and [for 
important command issues] he would make the 
decision” (W. Kerwin, personal communications, 
March, 20, 1998). Summarizing the structure of 
Marshall’s policy meetings, Cocke observed, He 
would… start the meeting with “We’re here to 
make a decision on this [issue]. I’d like to hear from 
the opposition here and the proponents here.” And 
he’d let each one talk three to five minutes. Then 
the decision would be made. (E. Cocke, personal 
communication, April 29, 1998)
Cocke later observed that Marshall was “[critical 
of ] Roosevelt during the war for allowing too many 
things [lower level issues] to come to him without 
a consensus” (E. Cocke, personal communication, 
April 29, 1998). Once Marshall made a decision, 
all of his subordinates were required to support that 
decision, but he carefully reflected on the competing 
opinions prior to making a decision. 
Marshall respected subordinates who could provide 
advice and even dissent prior to a decision. In this 
manner, he appreciated subordinates who could 
disagree with his analysis—reminiscent of some of 
Marshall’s earlier military experiences. Marshall’s 
admonishment of General Omar Bradley and 
other junior officers in 1939 was well known. After 
joining the Army secretariat in 1939, Bradley and 
his cohort were called into Marshall’s office, where 
they heard his displeasure for their lack of insight 
and independent thinking: “You haven’t disagreed 
with a single thing I had done all week.… Unless I 
hear all the arguments against something I am not 
sure whether I’ve made the right decision or not” 
(Bradley and Blair, 1983, pp. 83-84). Marshall is 
also recorded as having admonished Eisenhower for 
not disagreeing with him more forcefully: “When 
you disagree with my point of view, say so, without 
an apologetic approach” (Pogue, 1993b, p. 410). 
The interviews suggest a strong relationship 
between Marshall’s professional style—widely 
viewed as austere and impersonal—and his personal 
productivity. Pasco noted that Marshall intentionally 
created a firewall between his professional and 
personal lives: 
On trips and on many other occasions, he 
would ask about families, but only during off-
duty times. Whenever you were with him away 
from when he was performing his duties, he 
was interested in your family and children and 
what they were doing. When he made tours, 
however, he would focus on military training 
and the adequacy of supplies.… He did not 
mix [personal interest in others]; he did that 
separately. (M. Pasco, personal communication, 
November 11, 1997)
While this approach is widely credited as a 
“command face” by many, it was viewed by the 
interviewees as, in part, a productivity mechanism. 
Younger officers interacting with Marshall were 
both in awe and “scared as hell” of him. As Kerwin, 
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Pasco, and Goodpastor described, no one wanted 
to displease him. Marshall’s time and energy were 
dedicated to high-level efforts during WWII 
and later at the State and Defense Departments. 
Kennan said, “I cannot recall ever seeing him go 
very far from his office [at] the Department of 
State. He stayed there, by himself, and dealt with 
the people he thought it his duty to deal with” 
(personal communication, January 29, 1998). 
Kennan (personal communication, January 29, 
1998) further mentioned a story where Department 
of State officials were chasing after Marshall as 
he was leaving for the day. Marshall completely 
ignored them.
General Marshall’s personal effectiveness was 
based in large part on his temperance, that is, his 
ability to be in control of his feelings, moods, and 
impulses. He viewed anger as fatal and exhausting. 
Pasco noted continually throughout the interview 
Marshall’s self-control and paraphrased the 
comments he heard firsthand:
He would say, “I cannot allow myself to get 
angry, it would be fatal; it is too exhausting 
and too time consuming,” [and he] recognized 
the [potentially] adverse impact of emotions 
on decision making… “Don’t be a deep feeler 
and poor thinker,” that sort of thing. He’d just 
say, “Don’t let the emotions wrangle and whirl 
in you. Get to the bottom of it and make a 
decision.” (M. Pasco, personal communication, 
November 11, 1997)
Cocke added that he had witnessed Marshall 
unhappy with subordinates’ work, but noted that 
Marshall was sensitive to them, “never admonishing 
anyone in front of somebody else” (E. Cock, 
personal communication, April 29, 1998). Kerwin 
recalled that
He didn’t overly react. I never saw him get mad 
in a briefing or meeting. I could tell when he 
wasn’t pleased by his steely blue eyes and body 
language. He got mad when you didn’t give him 
what he wanted. I never saw him overly mad, 
just irritated. The general… didn’t get mad in 
the sense that a lot of people do when they 
get frustrated, sort of shooting off, pounding 
the desk, or something like that. He never 
got exasperated, and he never used any bad 
language, always polite. (W. Kerwin, personal 
communication, March 20, 1998)
Pasco observed a number of other things, besides 
poor performance, that frustrated General Marshall: 
[Marshall got mad at verbosity, people talking 
too much… long-winded reports, anything 
that wasn’t concise and right to the point. And 
people that were unjustly critical of what the 
Army was doing—that used to outrage him a 
great deal. Of course he saw a lot of that, and 
he’d often write a Congressman and inquire 
about something that he read in the paper that 
he disagreed with. Those sorts of things made 
him mad. (M. Pasco, personal communication, 
November 11, 1997)
An essential aspect of General Marshall’s personal 
productivity was the quality of placing the public 
good above any personal interest, thus exemplifying 
prudence and integrity. His selflessness, combined 
with his demand for excellence, motivated and 
sometimes frightened those around him. As 
Pasco observed, “We wanted to please him” (M. 
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Pasco, personal communication, November 11, 
1997). Each of the interviewees hinted at being 
in awe of General Marshall—awe based on his 
superior judgment, demeanor, and selflessness. 
Paul Hoffman, head of the European Cooperation 
Administration, observed, “I have never known 
anyone who in my opinion was as completely 
selfless as George Marshall was in the handling 
of any problem. I don’t think he ever gave it any 
thought as to how this would affect George 
Marshall” (Nitze, 1993, p. 8). Sexton stated, “I feel 
that George Marshall is just one notch below Jesus 
Christ” (Pogue, 1958c).
Theme II: Organizational Effectiveness
Marshall viewed organizational effectiveness through 
a holistic lens. Organizational effectiveness was 
facilitated by decentralized organizational structures 
and outstanding subordinates. He set overall strategy 
and priorities and allowed his subordinates to carry out 
those activities. Marshall provided subordinates with 
both authority and autonomy, but in return demanded 
clarity of thought, calculated risk-taking, and 
accountability. His organizational effectiveness was 
also related to his concern for building morale and keen 
ability to sum up political situations with important 
stakeholders and act accordingly. 
Marshall possessed a holistic view of an effective 
organization. For Marshall, well-organized 
structures and competent and empowered 
subordinates were required for effective operations. 
As General Kerwin observed toward the beginning 
of his interview, “If you’re looking for a real 
management forte, he reorganized the Army so that 
it could respond quickly and he picked the best and 
brightest for leadership roles” (W. Kerwin, personal 
communication, March 20, 1998). Effective and 
responsive command/organizational structures 
and people management skills were the themes 
that emerged throughout the interviews. Marshall 
clearly understood the importance of clear reporting 
lines. He also strongly emphasized delegation and 
accountability among subordinates. In all cases he 
expected and demanded that all members of his 
organizations put forth their best efforts. Given the 
complex realities of the milieu in which he served, 
these actions were exceptionally prudent. 
Generals Kerwin and Goodpaster, both 
accomplished and experienced military leaders, 
provided the greatest insights into Marshall’s 
organizational effectiveness. Marshall’s well-
documented Army re-organization of 1939 was 
central to their views on how he approached 
organizational effectiveness. As an insider, he was 
painfully aware of the difficulties associated with 
process and people and how these factors could 
adversely impact the U.S. Army during a critical 
period in history. When asked about Marshall’s 
abilities, General Kerwin’s observation was about 
his understanding how to organize. “He was a great 
organizer. I think the most important change he 
made when he became chief of staff right before 
the war was to reorganize the Army. He realized 
that the existing Army structure was not conducive 
to fast work” (W. Kerwin, personal communication, 
March 20, 1998). Goodpaster added, “The whole 
place was ossified before the reorganization, and 
that is why the restructuring had to occur” (personal 
communication, February 10, 1998). Marshall’s 
long Army career provided ample evidence 
that organizational fiefdoms and ineffective 
commanders created an organization that could 
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plan voluminously but not act. Marshall served as 
a reformer and innovator, breaking up bureaucratic 
fiefdoms that sought authority and influence for the 
sake of personal power. 
Marshall’s view of organization effectiveness, 
however, was more than just the organization and 
process. He was renowned as a master manager 
of subordinates. The interviews revealed both 
Marshall’s vision of command and his ability to 
implement that vision within a large, complex 
organization. Regarding the military context, 
Kerwin stated it very succinctly: “He was an 
outstanding commander and leader” (W. Kerwin, 
personal communication, March 20, 1998).
While history notes Marshall’s mastery over 
delegation and people, what is less certain is 
what exactly this means. Interviews suggest that 
Marshall’s approach was unique, not so much 
because of its objectives, but due to his ability to 
implement them. He identified the most talented 
individuals for critical roles, granted them 
authority, and then held them accountable for 
their success and failures. Goodpaster, speaking 
from the perspective of military history, observed 
that “Marshall had a reputation in the Army 
of being a free thinker and internal reformer” 
(personal communication, February 10, 1998). 
He was deadly opposed to the highly documented 
decision making that was currently employed by 
the U.S. Army. Goodpaster continued, “[Marshall] 
conducted a running battle with the commanders 
of the general staff school in Leavenworth, which 
was addicted to voluminous and ponderous 
plans and techniques” (personal communication, 
February 10, 1998). 
In another example of wisdom, Marshall’s ability to 
identify and advance talented young officers in the 
Army is well known. When asked what Marshall 
did best as a leader, Pasco, without hesitation, stated, 
“judge people’s abilities” (personal communication, 
November 11, 1997).
The people equation was essential for Marshall. 
He identified and selected talented subordinates. 
Equally significant was Marshall’s willingness 
to remove those subordinates who were not 
performing up to expectations. Once he became 
secretary of the Army, Marshall began a painful 
replacement of older officers with younger, 
highly talented officers. These older officers were 
Marshall’s contemporaries, and such removals 
and retirements were personally painful. Pasco 
described the situation as “difficult and painful for 
Marshall” (personal communication, November 
11, 1997). Marshall’s willingness to remove 
subordinates, however, was not limited to officers 
of his generation. Any officer or subordinate who 
was not achieving his objectives would be removed. 
Pasco describes several of these circumstances: 
I saw him relieve three officers at Fort Jackson 
one day. He just saw the condition of those 
divisions, and he knew how long they’d been 
there and he thought it ought to be better, and 
somebody else would just have to get this corps 
in shape. He thought, they’re going overseas 
soon, and they’re not ready. He just saw that. 
Other times he’d get reports from the head of 
the armored force or whoever was handling the 
infantry divisions. They’d ask to have people 
reassigned and relieved, and of course, if they 
were of general officer level and in command 
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of a division, the chief of staff had to approve 
the change. So he did it himself, but he got 
a lot of information too. And he could tell 
from the reports, efficiency reports and from 
the maneuver reports, which divisions were 
moving along and which weren’t. He’d find out 
why and order their relief real quick. (personal 
communication, November 11, 1997)
Supporting this philosophy, Goodpaster noted 
that Eisenhower often mentioned that Marshall 
had “encouraged him to cut the deadwood” 
(personal communication, February 10, 1998). 
Interestingly, Marshall assigned authority based 
upon performance. Pasco’s interview, in particular, 
was replete with his perspectives on those 
subordinates who the general personally enjoyed 
and those he did not. In all cases he treated his 
subordinates with respect and gave authority to 
those with the greatest ability. Pasco noted,
There was no great love lost, but General 
Marshall respected MacArthur. He always 
called every officer by their last name, 
including McNair… you name them all, 
except George Patton… But whenever he 
referred to MacArthur, he always said “that 
fellow MacArthur.” McCarthy always told me 
that that’s the code word for “SOB.” (personal 
communications, November 11, 1997)
There were close subordinates with whom 
Marshall would occasionally socialize, and others 
with whom he would not. Even so, his personal 
likes and dislikes did not count within the office—
he found and promoted the best and brightest.
While Marshall was a taskmaster by any standard, 
he delegated significant authority and autonomy 
to subordinates, especially to theatre commanders. 
Marshall’s view of tying authority to accountability 
was the essence of his leadership philosophy. 
Goodpaster said, “I used to speak with Eisenhower, 
often late in the afternoon, when he was President 
and I was working with him as staff secretary. On a 
number of occasions he stated that Marshall taught 
him the finer points of how to decentralize and 
delegate” (personal communication, February 10, 
1998). Based on his broad experience as a general 
and commander, Kerwin observed that it is often 
difficult for a commander not to get caught up in 
details; however, Marshall did not do this (W. 
Kerwin, personal communication, March 20, 1998). 
At the Department of State, Kennan also observed 
a similar pattern of Marshall granting authority to 
subordinates but holding them accountable (G. 
Kennan, personal communication, January 29, 1998).
The interviews provided a number of examples 
of General Marshall’s granting of support and 
authority to subordinates. Goodpaster observed 
that
The earliest point of guidance provided to 
me was that General Marshall did not try to 
conduct military operations out of Washington, 
DC. He did not attempt to run the operational 
aspects of the war, but rather, he looked to the 
theatre commanders to do that. I was told if 
an officer took a proposed directive in to the 
General Marshall that told Eisenhower or 
MacArthur just what to do, he would ask, “What 
does General Eisenhower [or MacArthur] say 
about this?” And if he was told, “I don’t know,” 
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then he would say, “Well, I think you had better 
find out.” And if the same man did it twice, 
he would say, “Get rid of that man” (personal 
communication, February 10, 1998).
He later provided a number of examples, two of 
which are cited below. The first was told to him 
by Eisenhower, the second he witnessed when 
Marshall served as secretary of defense under 
President Truman.
Eisenhower told me a story about Marshall 
visiting him during the North Africa campaign. 
When the operations in North Africa had been 
successfully completed, Marshall made a trip 
over to speak to Eisenhower… to congratulate 
him on his accomplishment.… Eisenhower said 
that one thing that he wanted to tell Marshall 
was that he was very much appreciative of 
an instruction that Marshall had sent him… 
that no American officer who served under 
Eisenhower’s command was sent unless he 
wanted them there. And Eisenhower said, “I 
appreciated that greatly.” General Marshall then 
stood back a moment, thought about it, and 
said, “Yes, Eisenhower, but it was more than 
that. If you had failed, you would not have had 
that as an excuse.” (A. Goodpaster, personal 
communication, February 10, 1998)
And [Marshall’s propensity to delegate and 
empower] was not just limited to his role as the 
Army’s chief of staff during the war. I remember 
when Marshall served as secretary of defense near 
the end of his career. At the time, I was working 
on Eisenhower’s staff, which was attempting to 
establish NATO’s nuclear command. General 
Gunther, Eisenhower’s chief of staff, was the 
man charged with making that happen. In 
order to get the operation established as soon as 
possible, we tended to staff the command with 
individuals who had performed similar duties 
during the war. There was this one individual we 
desperately needed for the Military Assistance 
Program (a program that provided military 
equipment to NATO allies needing to build 
up their arms). We asked [Brigadier General 
Frank] Bogart and later his chief, Major General 
Stanley Scott, to have this man reassigned. 
Bogart, however, didn’t want to give him up. 
So as reported to me, Major General Stanley 
Scott wrote a memo to General Marshall… a 
very good memo, stating the case really well… 
Marshall sent back with one line: “It is my policy 
at this time to give General Eisenhower anyone 
he needs—GCM.” (A. Goodpaster, personal 
communication, February 10, 1998)
Another time, Goodpaster recalled Lincoln 
returning from a meeting with Marshall where 
he stated, “General Marshall reminded us again 
that man is made for action. He asked what 
action we recommend that we should take” 
(personal communication, February 10, 1998). 
Kerwin, a young Lieutenant Colonel at the time, 
repeated throughout the interview that one of 
Marshall’s distinguishing characteristics was how 
intensely he would question subordinates as to 
their thought process and facts. He described 
the events in a meeting during the war that he 
remembered vividly. It was the only time he 
witnessed any hint of General Marshall not 
receiving the insights he expected.
I sat in on the first series of briefings for [potential] 
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military landings in Japan. I was mainly there 
because my boss was unavailable, and there 
were always some important questions about 
landing craft availability. During that meeting, 
I was sitting with all the generals and junior 
officers. General Marshall asked a whole series of 
questions on landing crafts. After about the third 
or fourth question, it was quite obvious that the 
group (General Hull, six to eight other generals, 
and a host of lesser ranking officers) didn’t have 
the answers. I will always remember that meeting: 
General Marshall looked around the room, and 
everyone got up and filed out. It was like a death 
knell. When we [the lower ranking officers] left 
the meeting, I was pretty sure that all hell broke 
loose because he was very unhappy with the 
outcome of the meeting. (W. Kerwin, personal 
communications, March 20, 1998)
Kerwin and Goodpaster also remarked on the 
latitude they possessed when working in the 
Operational Division during the war. While neither 
was directly supervised by Marshall, their efforts 
were no more than two levels from Marshall’s 
watchful eye. Kerwin joked that “I had more [real] 
power as a lieutenant colonel in the operation 
division than as vice chairman [of the joint chiefs 
of staff ]” (personal communication, March 20, 
1998). He recounted various stories where he led 
initiatives, including the establishment of a UK 
Command and leading an international training 
initiative involving radar equipment. Each initiative 
went to Marshall for review. Goodpaster also 
described projects where he and his group received 
high levels of authority and autonomy. One was the 
release of the deadly variable-timed (VT) fuse anti-
aircraft weapon for land-based operations. The VT 
fuse had been employed on water during the war 
with deadly effects to destroy enemy aircraft, but 
it had never been used where the Germans could 
pick up the VT fuse and reproduce it. Goodpaster 
played a major role in the study and the later release 
of this weapon for land-based operations. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Marshall’s 
leadership was to unlock the potential of 
subordinates to thrive in uncertain environments. 
This insight was identified by Goodpaster, Kerwin, 
and Pasco—those who interacted with him during 
the complex and uncertain years following Pearl 
Harbor. Goodpaster was most explicit in explaining 
what Marshall sought from his subordinates:
Marshall didn’t expect perfection from his 
subordinates. He knew that in times of war 
both sides were going to be caught by surprise. 
He was unique because he demanded that 
his people prepare for and quickly respond 
to surprises so that no event or series of 
events would be catastrophic. He demanded 
commanders take calculated and well thought 
out risks. MacArthur going into Leyte without 
air cover was a good example of the type of risks 
that Marshall encouraged. The whole operation 
was a big risk but probably shortened the war by 
six months to a year. (personal communication, 
March 10, 1998)
The observations of the interviewees, referencing 
Marshall’s frequent quizzing and demand for 
intricate and complex decision making, also fit 
in this portrait of Marshall’s view of an effective 
organization. Creative and dynamic thinking was 
expected from the entire organization.
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Marshall’s perception of people in the organization, 
however, was much broader than subordinate 
performance. He placed great emphasis on morale—
especially when serving as Army chief of staff. At 
a student graduation in 1941, he said, “Where 
there is high morale… all things are possible; 
without it, everything else—planning, preparation, 
production—count for naught” (Hambro, 1953). 
Pasco, who frequently travelled with Marshall, said, 
“The general kept his finger on the Army’s pulse 
by frequently visiting Army posts. [Whenever he] 
had any break in time he immediately wanted to see 
the troops being trained at Fort Jackson and Fort 
Bragg” (personal communication, November 11, 
1997). On these trips, he questioned soldiers about 
what was on their minds. Pasco adds that he “was 
interested in the details of the soldier’s life because 
that was the basis of good morale. And good 
morale was what the Army fought on” (personal 
communication, November 11, 1997). Marshall 
“was a great believer in doing the right things for 
the morale of troops” (personal communication, 
November 11, 1997).
Pasco also observed Marshall’s creation of the Army 
morale officer, with the rank of brigadier general. The 
position was not a career graveyard. Pasco observed,
It was supposed to be an important job. And he 
was very insistent on that. He thought that it 
was very important [to have people] who were 
articulate and capable… not people who were 
put there because they couldn’t do anything else. 
(personal communication, November 11, 1997)
Much has been written about the success of General 
Marshall in his interactions with Presidents Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, Congress, 
the press, and the U.S. Navy. The interviews 
suggest a more complex explanation for Marshall’s 
effectiveness in working with external stakeholders: 
his keen ability to sum up political situations and 
nuances and act accordingly. Within these political 
environments, he placed great emphasis on forming 
and maintaining alliances. In these settings, his 
personal embodiment of integrity, public service, 
and non-partisanship served him well. Marshall, 
as a holistic leader, possessed a strategic vision of 
what actions would be most effective and acted 
within the existing political environment to achieve 
the best outcome. He did so with candor and 
integrity in the context in which he operated, but 
he displayed considerable savvy and salesmanship 
where appropriate. Pasco observed that Marshall 
was “one of the greatest salesmen who ever lived 
and knew exactly how to approach people… [but] 
he rarely used this sales ability inside the Army” 
(personal communication, November 11, 1997). 
This observation provides considerable insight into 
how Marshall interacted with external stakeholders. 
The interviews provided a number of stories and 
insights on Marshall’s modus operandi with various 
external stakeholders while serving as Army chief 
of staff and in the Department of Defense. Given 
that three of the interviewees worked within the 
Operations Division during WWII, the majority of 
examples were related to that period and context.
Goodpaster and Pasco described interactions 
between Marshall and the U.S. Navy during WWII. 
Collaboration and information sharing between 
the Army and Navy was of paramount importance 
for the war effort, both for effective campaigns 
and to present a united front to the president. 
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Pasco (personal communication, November 11, 
1997) observed that Marshall was keenly aware 
that President Roosevelt, an ex-Navy man and 
former under-secretary of the Navy, was reputed 
to have a bias towards his branch of the military. 
While Marshall possessed strategic and tactical 
differences with the Navy leadership on waging the 
war (especially with prioritizing the German over 
the Japanese fronts), he placed great emphasis on 
effectively collaborating with Admiral King, the 
commander of the U.S. fleet and chief of naval 
operations in WWII. Pasco continued,
He made it a point of getting along with the 
Navy, made it a point of getting along with 
Admiral King. When anything came up, he 
would always get up and go to Admiral King’s 
office. He “stroked his fur” that way quite often. 
And he recognized the importance of the 
Marines and the Navy and wanted to cultivate 
them, but it was very difficult with King because 
King was a very rigid, indoctrinating officer, 
with not a lot of small talk and personality, 
either… but a very good Naval officer. (personal 
communication, November 11, 1997)
Marshall was also well known for his effective 
interaction with presidents, Congress, and the press. 
He was also known for influencing public opinion. 
He clearly understood the unique dynamics of 
interacting with these external stakeholders. 
Clearly, part of Marshall’s ability to affect outcomes 
was based upon the trust he engendered through 
the traits/characteristics of competency, strategic 
insights, integrity, faithful service, submission to 
civilian authority, and his apolitical nature.
In an exercise of practical wisdom, while Marshall 
always displayed candor and loyalty to the president, 
he also sought to adjust his methods in a way that 
would lead to his intended policy objective. For 
example, a staff officer came away impressed after 
witnessing a method Marshall employed to gain the 
president’s support for the Army’s reorganization 
and professionalization. FDR always declared 
himself a sailor, so Marshall ordered the creation 
of a visual consisting of a large cardboard diagram 
representing a ship: “Comprising the forward 
section, or bow, of the ship was a newly designated 
regular army triangular division. Back of that were 
two or three square National Guard divisions, and 
at the stern were the service elements to support the 
forward divisions” (Rosenblum, 1998). By encasing 
these organizational facts in a nautical container, 
however unrelated the two subjects may have been, 
Marshall succeeded in catching FDR’s eye. 
Marshall also placed great emphasis on his 
relationship with Congress. Pasco noted the 
significant effort Marshall dedicated to serving 
and effectively interacting with Congress. Pasco, 
who handled many Congressional requests, would 
continually interact with General Marshall on these 
requests with a summation of the request and a 
proposed solution. These were issues that Marshall 
was keenly interested in personally addressing. 
History reveals Congress’s great respect for General 
Marshall. Pasco continued, 
Congress had great respect for him because of 
the way he performed when he went up there… 
they were willing to leave him alone. When he 
got called to the Congress, he’d get a staff study 
that told it all—its outstanding problems and 
solutions. He’d read it, but he wouldn’t take it 
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with him. And he’d arrive up there, always got 
there about two minutes late, so there’d be a… 
bit of suspense. He’d say, “You gentlemen want 
to talk to me? What do you want to know?” And 
after about the fifth question, he’d unload the 
staff study on them out of his head. He didn’t 
memorize it, but he just had it in his head, and 
he had the ability to put it all in a logical way. 
He could make a case in the most amazing way 
you ever saw. If he believed in something, he 
knew how to sell it. And his character just sold 
itself.… Congress never doubted his integrity.… 
There was no question about whether what he 
said was right. If Marshall said it, it was true. 
(personal communication, November 11, 1997)
Marshall demonstrated great skill, loyalty, and 
integrity in dealing with Congress. As Pasco 
described, “When a request [from Congress] was 
submitted to Marshall, if it had merit they got 
it, if it didn’t he told them no and why” (personal 
communication, November 11, 1997). There was no 
question that General Marshall’s insight and analysis 
were correct. Congress accepted it. Like in his 
relationship with the president, Marshall was always 
gentlemanly and respectful. Goodpaster added 
that Marshall’s persona in Congress was that of a 
“straight shooter” who never lied or wasted anyone’s 
time (personal communication, February 10, 1998).
Summary
General George C. Marshall stands out as one of 
the most effective public servants of the  twentieth 
century. This paper reported the results of 
conversations with the last remaining individuals 
who had served and directly interacted with 
General Marshall. This cadre provided their stories 
and perceptions of Marshall as a leader, stories that 
can be categorized into personal and organizational 
effectiveness that derived from Marshall’s character. 
Marshall clearly behaved differently within 
alternative contextual environments while still 
enjoying universal respect as a man of integrity. 
Marshall understood the importance of people, 
reporting relationships, and organizational 
structures that were necessary for an effective 
organization. He knew that the power of individual 
initiative could be undermined by a bureaucratic 
and ossified organizational culture. To change 
this, he both radically re-organized the old Army 
and empowered his subordinates. Empowered 
subordinates, however, are not always competent 
and effective subordinates. He provided great 
authority, but also great responsibility. Those who 
were not effective were removed quickly. Marshall 
established structured but flexible environments, 
with the delegation of decision making and 
adherence to an organization’s mission. 
One of the more interesting aspects of General 
Marshall was his ability to remove emotion from his 
decision-making process while still empathizing and 
respecting subordinates. History reveals that among 
the most difficult tasks for Marshall were removing 
his peer generation from command positions or 
passing them over for promotion, but still he did 
these things. He removed junior officers who were 
not performing. Marshall was also well known for 
employing talented and flamboyant individuals, 
such as Douglas MacArthur, who he may not have 
liked personally but respected. Marshall treated 
individuals with honor and respect. The leadership 
literature often describes this attribute as “emotional 
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intelligence” (Goleman, 1995). One could argue 
that Marshall could command others because he 
could command himself. 
The interviews also suggest that Marshall was a 
master at balancing the somewhat contradictory 
forces of principle vs. pragmatism. Marshall was a 
man of great principle. History reveals his unique 
mixture of traits and characteristics, which include 
honesty, selflessness, intelligence and a keen ability 
to understand complex issues, reverence for the US 
constitutional system, and general leadership. On 
the other hand, Marshall’s ability to articulate stories 
and “sell” his visions as the best policy outcomes 
is legendary. Gardner and Laskin (1995) observe 
that Marshall’s messages were geared toward and 
sensitive to different audiences, but his personal 
ethos as a person of integrity and non-partisanship 
served him well. Cocke clearly notes that Marshall’s 
speeches were related to specific outcomes. In fact, 
he was a master at simultaneously demonstrating 
integrity and non-partisanship while advancing 
his preferred solutions—he was in essence a non-
partisan with strong political skills. He clearly 
perceived the intricate complexities of the political 
environment. He understood what he could achieve 
and what he could not achieve. As his actions with 
the Navy demonstrated, he would lose little battles 
to gain positive overall outcomes.
Marshall stands out among the full ensemble of 
American leaders in the excellence of his direct 
leadership in a military institution, in the larger 
society, and as a cabinet member with two portfolios. 
He assumed power because of his position in an 
institution, but he helped redefine that institution 
and others by the way he filled his role.
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Appendix 1:  
Interview Participant Background
Brigadier General Erle, Cocke, Jr. (1921-2000). Erle 
Cocke, Jr. was a renowned WWII hero and public 
servant. He collaborated with General Marshall as 
national commander of the American Legion (1950) and 
later served as a consultant and civilian aide to General 
Marshall and the Defense Department. He maintained 
a relationship with General Marshall after Marshall’s 
retirement from government service.
General Andrew J. Goodpaster (1915-2005). General 
Goodpaster, a well-known and leading general and 
public servant of the  twentieth century, served under 
General Marshall during WWII and later during his 
tenure as secretary of defense. He was assigned to the 
Operations Division (formally the War Plans Division) 
after being wounded during WWII. There he served 
under Colonel G. A. Lincoln and regularly interacted 
and observed General Marshall. Later, he worked on 
special projects for General Marshall during his tenure 
as secretary of defense, most notably on Study 360, 
which explored the US’s role in Greece and Turkey. 
General Goodpaster also assisted Marshall in writing his 
now famous 1953 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech. 
General Goodpaster’s close relationship with President 
Eisenhower also serves as a source of rich insights into 
Marshall’s management and leadership. Goodpaster 
served as President Eisenhower’s staff secretary and 
defense liaison officer from 1954 until 1961. During this 
time, Eisenhower shared with Goodpaster a variety of 
details about serving under General Marshall. General 
Goodpaster retired from the Army with the rank of four-
star general.
General Walter T. Kerwin (1917-2008). General Kerwin, 
another leading general of the  twentieth century, served 
as an operational briefer in the Operations Division after 
being injured in battle during WWII. General Kerwin 
was the Army’s second highest-ranking officer in the 
mid-1970s and is considered the lead designer of the 
all-volunteer army launched in 1973. General Kerwin 
retired from the Army with the rank of four-star general.
Ambassador George F. Kennan (1904-2005). Mr. Kennan 
worked with General Marshall at the State Department 
from 1947 to 1948. Kennan served as a diplomat, scholar, 
and foreign policy advisor, is widely recognized as the 
early intellectual force behind the “Soviet Containment 
Policy,” and was a major contributor to the Marshall Plan. 
Working with Marshall, Kennan created, and became 
the first director of, the Policy Planning Division within 
the Department of State. The Policy Planning Division 
served as a strategic think tank for Marshall. 
Mr. H. Merrill Pasco (1915-2008). Merrill Pasco served 
under General Marshall in the Operations Division 
throughout WWII. During that time, he served both as 
assistant secretary and then as secretary of the general 
staff. Mr. Pasco interacted extensively with General 
Marshall and continued a warm social relationship after 
the war. After leaving the military, he joined the law firm 
now known as Hunton & Williams, based in Richmond, 
VA, where he served as managing partner and later as 
senior counsel.
